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ABSTRACT
“Fake news” (FN) is slowly being recognized as a security problem that involves multiple academic disciplines; therefore, solving the problem of FN will rely on a cross-discipline approach where behavioral science, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, statistics, and cybersecurity work in concert to rapidly measure and 
evaluate the level of truth in any article. The proposed model relies on computational 
linguistics (CL) to identify characteristics between “true news” and FN so that true news 
content can be quantitatively characterized. Additionally, the pattern spread (PS) of true 
news differs from FN since FN relies, in part, on bots and trolls to saturate the news 
space. Finally, provenance will be addressed, not in the traditional way that examines 
the various sources, but in terms of the historical evaluations of author and publication 
CL and PS.
 Keywords— fake news; computational linguistics; pattern spread; provenance; trust 
I. INTRODUCTION
The term “fake news” (FN) was officially ushered into the lexicon when the Oxford Dic-
tionary added the term in 2017[1]. While the term is frequently used and definitions vary, 
the problem of deceptive data is serious and exposes a profound and underlying flaw in 
information and network security models. This flaw is trust in entities without verification 
of the content that they exchange. 
“Trust but verify”[2] is an old proverb that, until recently, resulted in trust at the expense 
of verification. Trust in journalists historically resulted from the reputation of the journal-
ist as well as the news organization (publisher). However, publisher reputations of news 
organizations can vary widely, and the line between news and entertainment continues to 
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blur[3]. The journalistic integrity of news organizations, while an interesting discussion, is not 
the focus of this effort; however, defining, measuring, and characterizing fact-based news is. 
Our historical method of placing trust in reporters and news organizations is under attack[4]. 
When a reporter can be discredited for $50,000 4] and a news story can be staged for $200,000[4], 
the facts within their context must be preserved and protected. Protection begins with under-
standing of the value asset that is to be protected. In the case of news, the assets include the 
story (data and metadata) as well as the reporter and publisher.
Insurance companies rely on statisticians to determine the value of items that they insure[5], 
allowing for reasonable prediction of repairs and replacements. Data in general could benefit 
from a similar model, and news data specifically needs an immediate solution that is accurate 
and efficient.
In some cases trust was assumed without any evidence of trustworthiness (e.g., Facebook 
and Twitter), resulting in large groups receiving news from social media sites[6]. In other cases, 
trust is granted based on reputation, as is the case with news sites[7]. In all cases, the changing 
role of the news media due to the internet results in a rush to deliver news first.
Any solution to FN must consider the full scope of information or the “totality of informa-
tion”[8]. The customization of the fake narratives and the targeted delivery demand that an ef-
fective solution fuse non-technical disciplines with traditional technical responses. The attacks 
may originate from any source, although the Russian-based attacks are quite sophisticated[9] 
and have gathered quite a bit of attention. 
There are aspects of the Russian approach that warrant inclusion into the framework, even if 
the implementation becomes uniquely Western. The Russian term “protivoborstvo” describes 
the intentionally created rhetorical game that is foundational to FN; this rhetorical game can 
partially be addressed using CL and machine learning (ML), illustrating one example of inter-
disciplinary fusion.
FN and deceptive information campaigns can be thought of as opening shots in future in-
formation conflict that supports hybrid warfare[10,11]. This framework may provide guidance 
for countering deceptive information campaigns. We have no cyber equivalent for “trust but 
verify” (yet). The purpose of this paper is to introduce a framework for evaluating FN. This 
framework may provide the cyber equivalent of trust but verify[2] for FN. In addition to counter-
ing Russian FN efforts, this framework provides a foundation for examining the quality of data 
and may assist analysts in evaluating other news stories or events.
II. BACKGROUND
Falsehoods and deception in political discourse are a long-standing problem in an industry 
where words matter. Deception and propaganda have a long history: the Trojan Horse serves as 
an example of one of the earliest deceptions[12]. The internet makes possible the ability to deliv-
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er deceptive messages to a larger audience and social media data made possible the customiza-
tion of deceptive data[13]. Data science techniques performed by Cambridge Analytica[14] made 
possible the rapid customization of messaging. Chatbots exacerbated the problem through the 
use of artificial intelligence (AI) software that could dynamically adjust to and manipulate user 
responses[15].
There are many ways that facts can be distorted, resulting in altered perceptions, but there 
are a limited number of ways that facts can remain faithful to their original creation. This 
provides an entry point into the solution. Thus, attempting to model deceptive data is similar 
to attempting to model malware or any other host of cybersecurity problems. Deception is 
unbounded; therefore, attempting to model or predict deceptive data is difficult and subject to 
continual change. Facts, however, are constrained, allowing for more accurate modeling. While 
deceptive data may have several common features, all of these features should be examined in 
the context of the factual data that the deception is designed to conquer.
In order for deceptive data to be effective, the data should elicit an emotional response [16]; 
otherwise, the data would be quickly forgotten. The response does not always need to be strong; 
this avoids the suspicion of hyperbole. Trust must be gained regarding deceptive data, and 
while trusted users can shorten the time required, a little initial skepticism is normal. Russian 
deceptions build the FN foundation by offering an alternative view or narrative that is designed 
to sound reasonable[17-19]. 
A. What is Propaganda?
Propaganda is information or ideas that are spread by a group, such as a government, with 
the goal of influencing a targeted group’s or person’s opinions through the omission of facts 
or by secretly emphasizing only one narrative of the facts[20]. Oftentimes deliberately used to 
control, influence, or change the cognition of the targeted group, propaganda entwines funda-
mental elements of psychology and technology in service of the goal. Psychological aspects 
of propaganda include campaigns to win the minds, means, and measures of message distri-
bution, which requires a behavioral science understanding of message creation and applica-
tion[21]. The past is understood through the information that was recorded and left behind by 
the scribes of the particular time. Chronicles and annals provide contextual understanding of 
the past; however, these writings contain the biases of the scholars, historians, clergy, rulers, 
and ordinary citizens in local communities[22].
In order for propaganda to be effective, the source or purveyor needs to fully understand the 
values of its target audience, thus rendering the target’s intellect ineffective. The most accom-
plished propagandist discerns and plays on its target’s values, morals, needs, or fears[16]. This 
goal can be achieved subtly or overtly based on the values of the target.
Taylor suggests that the earliest form of propagandist imagery occurred in the Neolithic 
Age[23]. The use of war propaganda may be found in Neolithic cave paintings, where imagery 
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carved in the wall commemorated battles.  The carvings on cave walls illustrated clans’ victori-
ous battles; clans made them celebrate their victories and intimidate other tribes[23]. 
Ancient Greece also offers some of the first examples of propaganda. Speech was utilized 
for conveying persuasive messages. Ingram provides the example of Confucius’ writings, the 
Analects, which were used to persuade[16]. The men who read these writings were supposed to 
live a more meaningful existence. From Ancient Greece to Alexander the Great to the pharaohs 
of Egypt, propaganda was a weapon of choice to change targets’ cognition. Egyptian pharaohs’ 
propagandist messages were prestige, nobility, and imperial legitimacy exemplified by grandi-
ose architecture[24]. 
The Roman Empire largely influenced civilization, reaching into Italy, the Mediterranean, 
Britain, North Africa, Portugal, and the Persian Gulf. Dating back to 48 B.C., Gaius Julius Cae-
sar (Julius Caesar), father of Caesar Augustus (Augustus), the first emperor of Rome, used 
political manipulation to win the support of the people[25]. Julius Caesar wrote war memoirs 
chronicling the achievements of the civil war between Gaul and Pompey (Gnaeus Pompeius 
Magnus) and the spoils of victory. Caesar sent runners to deliver war memoirs to be read before 
a crowd in a public area as the battle progressed[25]. This action showed the recognition of both 
message craft and delivery speed since the common people, or plebeians, were not literate, and 
Caesar knew he needed their support. This early form of propaganda resulted in Julius Caesar 
being heralded as a hero[25]. 
Patriotism was tied to the military, and only Roman citizens could be members of the mili-
tary force; thus, the fighting force was respected and feared by all. In addition, Julius Caesar 
had a strong reputation for looking after the Roman legions. Caesar’s focus on public opinion 
and strong concentration on providing for his military forces was a major reason the memoirs 
were successful, and the strong public opinion paved the way for Augustus[25,26]. Augustus used 
writings as a means to deliver public information; these writings manipulated the events to tell 
stories from Augustus’ perspective. Statues, monuments, and coins were also used to spread 
the image of Augustus as a strong military leader, a statesman, and peacekeeper[25].
In addition to the spoken word, propagandist messaging was also accomplished through 
imagery, and this form of messaging remains popular today. In the early Stone Age, depictions 
of war were carved on cave walls; later, they were drawn on paper or scrolls. As propaganda 
matured, messaging was imprinted on clothing incorporated through imagery. This included 
stunning regalia and insignia-laden outfits[21].
Eighteenth-century propagandists successfully used political cartoons and caricatures to di-
rectly communicate with their intended audiences[16]. The caricatures and prints were biased 
in nature and oftentimes made fun of or poked individuals. The convergence of humor and 
politics in this new approach was well received.
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Propaganda continued to be a means of influence in times of conflict. During the Civil War, 
cartoons became a popular propaganda medium. Animated movies and political and military 
cartoons became an attractive means for distributing propaganda[27]. Propagandist cartoons 
can be divided into two categories: cathartic and ad justice[28]. 
A cathartic cartoon was successful when the message convinced people that they had noth-
ing to fear from the enemy. An ad justice cartoon was designed to spur action and could be 
considered successful when the message inspired voluntary enlistment in the Union forces, 
for example. One famous cartoon was Thomas Nast’s “Compromise with the South,” from Sep-
tember 1864. This propagandist-cartoonist used the symbols of his trade to guide the audience 
toward a certain predisposed objective; his cartoons condemned the idea of compromise by 
emphasizing the lives that had been sacrificed for the cause[28].
According to Hinklemann, Hitler’s Mein Kampf is considered an advanced work on the use 
of propaganda as a way to collect large numbers of supporters[28]. The book masterfully pulled 
the audience into accepting only the author’s views as true and shifted blame for previous 
failures away from himself to the other Germans leaders, thus perpetuating a victim mentali-
ty[27,28]. Mein Kampf  appealed directly to emotions formed from values and biases rather than 
logic. The blending of anti-Semitism and nationalism provided a way for Germany to survive—
through anti-Semitism as a form of nationalism or love of country. 
Hinklemann observes that Hitler believed that good propaganda targeted emotion and not 
intelligence or the facts. Hitler played on the hatred and despair felt by lower-class Germans. 
By preying on these Germans’ poor economic status and fear of being unable to provide food 
and clothing for their families[28], Hitler elevated emotions using reason. Combining Hitler’s 
emotional elevation with Western societies’ need to assign blame[29] and cultural mores[30] re-
garding uncertainty, avoidance, and fear of the unfamiliar, the Jewish population, along with 
other non-Aryan groups, were assigned the blame for the economic problems of Germany.
The United States used radio and movies to disseminate propaganda during World War II. 
Both Japan and the U.S. held competitions to create patriotic theme songs. Each soldier serving 
in the U.S. military was issued a songbook containing songs such as “Anchor Aweigh” and 
“Marine Corps Hymn.” The songbook was part of standard issue[31]. Japan, in an interesting 
twist, used American songs as propaganda to make American GIs homesick and weaken the 
American forces. Furthermore, the Japanese Government forbade the playing of American 
music at home[31]. 
The Japanese were portrayed negatively in the media by focusing on physical characteristics 
such as crossed eyes and bucked teeth. The Japanese were referred to as “Japs,” “back-stabbing 
monkeys,” and “sneaky yellow rats”[31] in an attempt to dehumanize them, with the goal of 
shaping behavior and inciting desired actions[16]. 
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Music with propagandist lyrics serves to convey meaning to the intended audience. Propa-
gandist music instills a general feeling or emotion and, with the proper message, serves as a 
mechanism for the transmission of propaganda.  Music, in general, makes messaging easier to 
retain due in part to patterns and repetition [33].
 Similarly, movies are a natural medium for propaganda. A moviegoer becomes a type of 
“hypnotized person” vulnerable to suggestions presented by a film[31]. High-quality visual and 
audio design serves to reinforce the message[32,33].
The message creation aspects of propaganda continue to evolve, growing more sophisticated 
and polished as technology improves and knowledge grows. As topics, phrases, and various 
aspects of crafting a message change, the important thing to remember is that the goal remains 
the same. Of equal importance is that a message has no value until it has been delivered, re-
ceived, and interpreted. 
The technological and behavioral aspects are loosely grouped as “message delivery.” Ad-
vancements in communication, military strategy, and technology and fluctuating partisan-elite 
rapport and populace contribute to the changing landscape of message delivery[16]. According 
to Ingram, scholars and scientists in modern times study, determine, and understand propa-
ganda campaigns and techniques and equate said campaigns to daily societal issues[16]. 
“Falsehoods fly, and the truth comes limping after it”[34]. Beginning with the runners used by 
Julius Caesar to deliver false messages as battles raged and continuing through to the written 
press and, more recently, images that travel at line speed, falsehoods continue to fly. Mean-
while, the facts surrounding an event take time to be researched and identified
With the invention of the printing press and print engravings, propagandists were able to 
print their messages on a mass scale. After 1880, messages were further impacted with the 
inclusion of photographs[21]. Photographs could be staged or real, and the black-and-white 
images, eventually becoming full-color, made a real impact on targets’ cognitive perception. 
Eventually, motion pictures—first presented in black-and-white and, later, in color—captured 
society’s attention[21].   
During the literary age, propaganda was produced through pamphlets, newspaper articles, 
advertisements, flyers, billboards, and any other means that could alter or change an individu-
al’s cognitive perception. Later, satirical caricatures and cartoons were used for target audienc-
es. Propaganda campaigns utilized a new visual element which proved to be quite successful[16].
In addition to literary campaigns and structural campaigns, propaganda messages have also 
been waged through radio, satellite, and broadband communications. During the Vietnam War, 
radio airwaves were laden with propaganda both for the United States and Vietnam[35]. Radio 
stations, including The Voice of America, the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty, trans-
mitted both attributed and unattributed messages to their targeted audiences[16]. 
Twentieth-century propagandists utilized multiple means of delivery for their messages, 
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using advertising and other techniques to convey the intended message to targets[21]. All of 
these methods were asynchronously delivered. In the 21st century, technological advances 
in communications, computers, networks, smartphones, and the internet of things make a 
broader landscape available to propagandists and enable media saturation. For example, social 
media’s role in the Arab Spring resulted in a new trusted news source for users. The rise of 
social media has made this new landscape more user-friendly and, perhaps more importantly, 
more trustworthy. 
More recently, internet usage introduced a 21st-century feature: the ability to rapidly dis-
seminate deceptive data both asynchronously and synchronously. Initial dissemination relied 
heavily on bots and trolls to establish a starting point. Once the starting point had been estab-
lished, the dissemination reached the targets directly through the trusted channels of social 
media and social media trust relationships. Furthermore, the timing of the release of deceptive 
data took advantage of the inability to rapidly discern truth, allowing the falsehoods to fly. 
This strategic timing release of deceptive information is also known as weaponized informa-
tion[36]. This timed, mass release of weaponized information gives sources more control over 
the spread than they enjoyed previously. This synchronous component relies on a mixture of 
“true believers” (also known as “useful idiots”) acting as trolls, paid trolls, and AI-controlled 
chatbots.
The new landscape continues to grow and the amount of information available in this new 
environment is so rich that a new discipline, data science, has emerged. New technology uti-
lizing data science techniques allows for more accurate target identification and continuous 
bombardment with specially crafted messages from trusted or quasi-trusted sources. The vol-
ume of these messages that reinforce values can effectively alter the target’s perception. When 
the targeted user seeks to verify the content of a message, a large number of similar messages 
are returned, and the target now knows that other people share the same values and beliefs.
B. Countering Propaganda
Research into CL shows that news can be accurately separated into truth, falsehoods, and 
satire through the analysis of linguistic features[37]. The credibility toolkit provides the ability 
to assess news articles along the axes of reliability and objectivity as well as potential social 
media communities that might be interested in the content of the article[38]. The toolkit pro-
vides visualization tools to assist in interpretation. Thus, CL may offer a means of performing 
preliminary tagging of a news article for rapid evaluation of that article’s veracity. In addition 
to CL, a reputation analysis and PS may also offer valid insights that assist in the evaluation of 
a news story’s veracity.
The initial response to FN relied on fact checking through sources such as Snopes[39], Politi-
Fact[40], and other fact-checking sites. This method has worked well for years, but is time-in-
tensive and easily overwhelmed with the volume of FN stories that are generated throughout 
the course of a campaign. Fig. 1 provides an example of a hashtag associated with a fact-based 
178 | THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW
A MODEL FOR EVALUATING FAKE NEWS
narrative and fig. 2 illustrates the fact-based narrative overlaid with the hashtag associated 
with the fake news narrative[41]. Thus, fig. 2 shows the fact-based narrative being easily over-
whelmed by the fake narrative.
 
Figure 1: Hashtag associated with fact-based narrative
Fig. 1 shows the activity on #spain from August 1, 2017, to December 1, 2017, with the ac-
tual vote taking place on October 1, 2017, the highest of the three peaks[25].
 
 
Figure 2: Fact-based hashtag overlaid with fake hashtag
The steep, peaked line in fig. 2 shows the rapid and intense injection of the #catalanrefer-
endum hashtag associated with the fake narrative in the same time window as #spain. Notice 
the high volume and the very short time-line for the fake narrative[41]. By introducing the fake 
narrative so close to the election (much like the introduction of Clinton’s emails[42] and Ma-
cron’s emails[43]), the target has little to no time to respond; thus, the information at this point 
is weaponized and active.  
The volume associated with fake narratives is problematic because if the reader attempts to 
look up the story, a large number of the same narratives will be returned, thus validating the 
fake narrative to the reader. It takes time for fact-checking sites to perform research and post 
their findings, and when the source of the fake story is a friend, other close relationship biases 
are at play. Readers who are unable to determine the veracity of a news story oftentimes lack 
the time and resources to look up the story in question; instead, they rely on mental shortcuts 
such as biases[44] and source reputation to determine trustworthiness[45].
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The reliance on reputation has been exploited in two ways. The first is through the use of 
popular social media applications, where, through the targeting of groups, multiple trusted 
entries become access points for individual members into society-at-large. Consider social me-
dia’s original mission of bringing together like-minded people to share information in the spirit 
of friendship and fellowship[46,47]. These platforms have also provided a channel for the distribu-
tion of FN since the content on these sites is also promoted as news stories. These same sites, 
such as Twitter, became trusted news sources due to their role in the Arab Spring[48]. 
While social media sites have recently come under fire for the distribution of FN, these same 
sites were commended for their role in the Arab Spring. The second manner in which reputa-
tion has been exploited is the discrediting of reporters. A recent report on FN revealed that a 
journalist could be discredited for $50,000 and a news event, such as a protest, can be staged 
for $200,000[4]. When these events are considered collectively, the use of reputation analysis 
becomes problematic. Furthermore, reputation analysis is vulnerable to the flux problem that 
has plagued domain name system servers.
The issue of trusting sources is complex and long-standing, as is the history of verifying 
trust. The handshake was one of the earliest examples of verifying trust[45]. Referred to as “data 
fidelity,” the verification of trust in the virtual environment is more difficult[49,50]. A solution to 
this is proposed in detail in section III of this paper. 
Old models may serve as inspiration in the design of the newer models for FN evaluation. 
Blind trust without verification of the information that is disseminated has been exploited. 
Trust in news sources continues to be manipulated. Untruths not only spread fast, but automat-
ed bots can persuade doubtful readers through interactive dialogue. The purveyors of propa-
ganda have carefully profiled their targets, values, and beliefs before crafting their messages. 
The old adage about bringing a knife to a gunfight can now be replaced with bringing a gun to 
a bot fight.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
The model for evaluating FN relies on three areas: CL, PS, and source provenance (SP). Each 
area will be discussed in greater detail in the following subsections. CL findings can feed the 
PS and SP, while PS also can feed SP. 
A. FN Content Analysis Using Computational Linguistics (CL)
There are several unique characteristics associated with FN, such as the size of the story in 
relation to the headline[4] and the use of descriptive words and other features[16]. As noted ear-
lier, attempting to model the numerous characteristics of the ever-changing, deceptive data is 
not an efficient method, but modeling the facts or ground truth data (GTD) is. 
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This study requires researchers to enhance the existing RPI software with the intent of ex-
panding the rating of the software to place event stories (from AP, Reuters, and Bloomberg) as 
GTD or μ in the distribution. As stories become embellished, the markers increase, resulting 
in the growing  value of deviations. We will use a number of other unreliable sources to assess 
which markers are especially useful to track. Conversely, when stories omit key pieces of in-
formation, the markers will decrease or unrelated events will be used to fill the space; these 
unrelated events are oftentimes distractors which use a technique commonly referred to as 
“whataboutism”[4]. Finally, traits such as repeating the same point three times[4] will be consid-
ered a deviation measure. Fig. 3 depicts the proposed scoring scale. 
Figure 3: Scoring scale for CL output
The proposed scoring scale uses the AP/Reuters/Bloomberg results as the basis for scoring 
(0) or μ. The deviations from this in either direction reflect the deviations from the original 
event. A deviation score of -10 would indicate the story was likely taken so far out of context 
that the story is no longer recognized. Similarly, a story with a +10 deviation score would in-
dicate that the story was so radically embellished that the original event may no longer be the 
central theme of the story. 
The resultant score is an average of the criteria scores obtained from parts of speech, tone, 
ratios, etc. The overall score becomes a label used for both storage and signal  identification. 
The storage label becomes relevant for comparisons used in SP, and can be useful when a story 
originates without the GT sources. The second use for the overall CL score, signal identifica-
tion, is explained in the PS subsection.
B. FN in Motion: The Pattern Spread (PS)
Earlier background discussion highlighted both temporal and volume aspects of FN distri-
bution. From Julius Caesar’s runners to print media to radio, television, and, more recently, 
the internet, the speed of distribution has minimally kept pace with news and, in some cases, 
outpaced news[51]. Before the advent of the internet, mass propaganda delivery tended to be 
asynchronous in nature, but with the fusing of AI and data science, chatbots can be deployed at 
a large scale, allowing for interactive dissemination at scale. All events leave traces, and digital 
events are no different. While some stories follow a meme-like pattern[52], the FN PS differs; this 
will be further discussed in future work.
The PS of FN offers an opportunity to revisit and reexamine aspects of signal processing. The 
noise level on the internet is very high, making the signal more difficult to identify. This noisy 
environment provides an opportunity for the identification and labeling of news stories using 
the techniques described in CL. The labeling should result in a picture of the environment 
resembling a prepainted, paint-by-numbers picture in which the various labeled items ideally 
form  clusters.
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Fig.1 and fig. 2 show the difference in the spread of a fact-based hashtag and a FN-associated 
hashtag. The indiscriminate use of bots and trolls resulted in the obvious signal, but China 
has shown that a different signal can be as effective[4]. Nevertheless, in the cases of Russia and 
China, automated software was used, and software is most efficient at patterned repetition. 
Understanding the PS of a fact-based narrative is the first signal that requires identification. 
Once removed from the noise field, the remaining clusters can be identified and each deviation 
from the fact-based narrative can then be characterized numerically. Numeric characterization 
can be used when performing analytics in SP processing. 
By performing the operations in the specified order of CL preceding PS, an additional benefit 
may possibly be had in the identification of the interactive behavior patterns. Ideally, 21 gener-
al PS signals should be initially detected. Naturally, ML algorithms will need to be evaluated to 
determine which one offers the greatest accuracy.
Detection of bots in general and chatbots specifically will require additional analysis. In ad-
dition, determining the chatbot signals in chatbots designed to increase amplification in efforts 
to persuade will likely require AI[53]. In those cases, once identified, the dialogue can be ana-
lyzed through some of the CL techniques addressed previously. This particular aspect of FN is 
a separate but related effort.
C. Source Provenance (SP)
Data provenance has a long history of research that precedes the introduction of FN. Data 
provenance details data origination and the process through which the data arrived into the 
system[54]. According to this definition, data provenance can be likened to quality assurance 
processes surrounding software development where, once again, the job of reliability or, in this 
case, the veracity component of examining the content remains ignored. This area can also be 
revisited and the solution can be more robust than with digital ledgers[55,56], where entities can 
collude to lie.
By maintaining archive data on fact-based news, FN, and the values associated with these 
stories, additional information can be extracted on authors and publishers. Publishers’ and 
authors’ reputations can be manipulated in an attempt to decrease[4] or increase their credibil-
ity. Thus, reputation analysis becomes problematic. However, by maintaining the first two ele-
ments of CL and PS and associating those values over time with both authors and publications, 
new patterns will emerge. 
In the simplest cases, instances in which reporters are artificially discredited will be easily 
detected when examining the body of an author’s or publisher’s work. Additionally, temporal 
analysis can detect trends in the same body of works indicating a trend toward FN or fact-based 
narratives. If authors move to different publishers or publishers change names in an attempt 
to hide bad reputations, the characteristics of their previous work remain, allowing for the 
matching of emerging entities to existing bodies of work found in the archive.
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This final area of FN determination relies heavily on the first two areas being developed. Both 
areas are in the early stages of development, so quite possibly other features will become rele-
vant in the SP area. In spite of the lack of details, the basic concept can be drawn, recognizing 
that changes will be incorporated.
IV. DISCUSSION
The proposed model, while not perfect, offers a robust approach that can be easily modified 
or presented in an easily understood manner. Most credible news stories will likely fall within 
two standard deviations of the fact-based event reported. By focusing on the wording of fact-
based narratives and characterizing these narratives, a certain robustness is built in for Byz-
antine behaviors which may arise as the propagandists attempt to tailor messages to match the 
rules of fact-based narratives. This may be less problematic as the text would have to be less 
emotionally appealing, possibly resulting in lower efficacy.
A more significant problem with this model would likely be related to linguistic traits and 
slang expressions across languages, cultures, subcultures, and tribes. The potential to inac-
curately score an article is present. This work would benefit from the involvement of other 
experts, including linguists and social scientists..
A more interesting and potentially more challenging  scenario revolves around the improve-
ment of automated behaviors to more accurately reflect human behaviors. This may affect the 
PS component of the model. Historically speaking, the behavior of presenting propaganda first 
may also offer insight into detection. As FN pattern signals become better understood, temporal 
analysis will also provide additional new insights. Finally, as the archive grows and more data 
analytics are performed on the archived data, the ability to distinguish the fact-based narra-
tives from the FN narrative will likely grow in sophistication.  
V. EXAMPLE CASE
Before processing can begin, rules must be examined and tested. The first processing com-
ponent relies on the translation of propaganda rules into computational linguistic rules. An 
example of one of the rules of propaganda is that the message must appear interesting to the 
target and use an attention-getting distribution medium[57]. Thus, attention-grabbing headlines 
complete with pictures displayed on websites and social media sites would be an example.
In English, verbs are action words and adverbs are descriptor words; these words are used 
to convey what happened and provide details capable of eliciting a response. Thus, the article 
length and the rate of adverbs may provide a possible marker as a metric deviation from fact. 
Of course, these alone are not sufficient, but serve as an example for illustrative purposes. Also 
considered but not measured in this particular example is the role of context in describing 
event news.
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One assumption suggested that the news wire (AP News, Reuters, or Bloomberg) would re-
port the fact-based narrative, and the model suggests that the fact-based narrative should serve 
as μ. The example chosen occurred in 2016, when candidate Clinton collapsed at the 9/11 cer-
emonies in New York City. The source sites were selected based on a Google search for “Clinton 
collapse 2016.” The news sites were NBC News, the Washington Post, Fox News, and the New 
York Post. An additional opinion piece was selected with the purpose of providing observation-
al data on this type of publication.
Figure 4: % difference equation
As expected, the AP News story word count was in the middle of the group; it ranked third 
of six in order of low to high word count. The word count for the smallest story was 179 words 
and the largest story was 1,331 words. Because only one story was selected for this effort, there 
are no average values for news stories and no standard deviations (σ). The results of the word 
count are shown in table 1. The corresponding bar chart is depicted in fig. 5. Percent-based 
differences were calculated using the logic displayed in fig. 4.
 
     
       
Source Word Count % Change
AP News 840 0
Connor Post 923 +10%
Fox News 179 -79%
NBC 885 +5%
New York Post 693 -17%
Washington Post 1331 +58.5%
Table 1: News article word count
Figure 5: News article word count
184 | THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW
A MODEL FOR EVALUATING FAKE NEWS
The most dramatic differences can be seen with Fox News and the Washington Post. The 
negative differences associated with with Fox and the New York Post suggest the potential 
for missing context, where part of the narrative may be missing. Missing context results in 
the reader having to mentally complete the story by relying on existing cognitive biases. The 
further the measured distance from the μ in the negative direction, the greater the potential 
for the reader to rely on cognitive biases. The New York Post and, to a lesser extent, the Connor 
Post show a significant deviation. 
The Washington Post showed a large deviation in the opposite direction in terms of word 
count, suggesting that, minimally, the publication embellishes, but, in the absence of σ, mea-
sures to determine normal variance are not yet available. Additionally, rules that separate con-
text from propaganda would require translation into CL terms and software. Presently, much of 
the CL software requires modifications due to the cleaning of terms that are typically used in 
propaganda but are problematic for CL (e.g., “them”). 
In both cases of strong deviation from the AP story, there are no measures of variance, or σ, 
since this is an exemplar while the research continues to determine the optimal list of weigh-
ing factors. Word count determines the positive or negative assignations and initial weight of 
the deviation. The weights will be modified over time as algorithms are tuned and the archive 
grows.
Another measure is the usage of adverbs. Because the stories are of varying lengths, the 
measure uses percentage values obtained by dividing the total number of adverbs in an article 
by the total number of words in that article. Fig. 6 shows the equation used to calculate the 
percentage change from the AP adverb percentages. Table 2 shows the resultant numeric dif-
ferences and fig. 7 depicts the bar chart representation of the adverbs. 
Figure 6: Equation to determine adverb distribution rate derivation from AP News
   
Source # Adverbs % Adverbs % Change from AP
AP News 19 2.3 0
Connor Post 45 4.9 +113%
Fox News 3 1.7 -26%
NBC 30 3.4 48%
New York Post 32 4.6 100%
Washington Post 50 3.8 65%
Table 2: Adverb rates per article
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Table 1: News article word count
Figure 7: Adverb rates per article
Adverb usage helps to add context to the word findings. If verbs are considered action words, 
then adverbs are the action descriptors that are capable of adding urgency, confusion, or other 
emotions designed to manipulate emotional response. Descriptors the nouns and verbs that 
they define more dramatic.
Working off of the assumption that AP News provides the baseline, a quick examination of 
the values shows that the Washington Post has the most adverbs; however, when examined in 
the context of the number of words, the Connor Post (opinion article) and the New York Post 
show greater deviance from AP News. This positive deviance suggests embellishment, where-
as the deviation by the Washington Post and NBC suggests a level of bias in the article. The 
Fox News deviation may be too small to measure for this particular example; however, when 
combined with the small word count, the possibility that a partial fact is being reported must 
be considered.
While not counted in this example, other items of interest include the punctuation deviations 
and paragraph sentence counts. The Connor Post and Fox both had the punctuation character 
“?” in their stories. This use of the “?” was of interest for two reasons. The first reason is that, 
by asking a question, the article provides an entry point from which it draws in readers, with 
the hope of engaging them in the process. The second is that most news stories use a period; 
thus, “?” or “!” are used for special stories that are designed to elicit a response that is most 
likely emotional.  
One other observation that may result in a marker for opinion pieces is the number of sen-
tences in a paragraph. In the opinion piece (Connor Post), the vast majority of paragraphs 
contain three or more sentences. This finding was in contrast to all of the other news articles, 
which typically contained single-sentence paragraphs or two-sentence paragraphs.
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As the remaining criteria emerge and deviations from fact-based narratives (AP, Reuters, and 
Bloomberg) are determined, the differences can be averaged, creating the overall tag values 
for the articles. The tagged value is used to assist in defining characteristics that will be used 
to define training data characteristics for use in ML algorithms. Table 3 contains the overall 
deviation values for the six sources. The values for this table were simple averages obtained 
through the equal weighting of inputs (words and verbs). The overall percentage values were 
divided by 10 to create the measure off μ, which was used to fit the overall article scoring scale.
 
  
       
Source Overall  %Value μ Distance 
AP News 0 0
Connor Post 61.5% 6.15
Fox News 52.5% -5.25
NBC 26.5 2.65
New York Post 58.5 -5.85
Washington Post 61.5 6.15
Table 3: Overall deviation measures
While some of the values suggest a high deviance, they should be considered in the context 
of a single story lacking a corpus of data for baselining and comparison. As mentioned earlier, 
separating context from propaganda terms improves the fidelity of the model, as does the tun-
ing of algorithm weighting. One key finding was that, as suspected, the AP News story served 
as a good center point because, in both word count and adverb rates, there were entries above 
and below the AP News values.
In addition to fact-checking, trending may also be useful in tuning. The values seen in column 
three of table 3 represent the final value with which the news article is tagged. This assigned 
number can be used to tag or identify the article for observation in the larger stream of articles 
in the second processing phase of PS analysis. PS analysis will likely be highly dependent upon 
AI/ML techniques for both tagging and classification.
The remaining description is of a proposed archive where results from CL and PS can be 
stored and made available for additional analysis. The archive has not yet been built, but there 
are certain pieces of information that are of interest to this area of research. Of note, the archive 
is not designed to compete with existing archives; rather, the archive is designed to augment 
existing archives. The archive, which primarily provides historic data on meta-fields, should 
supplement other news archives. The archive is designed to encourage additional studies by 
other researchers. The design of the archive proposed here is preliminary in nature; records 
will most likely be stored as comma-separated value records. Table 4 provides a brief descrip-
tion for each of the fields. 
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Field Description
Identifier Unique record identifier
Author(s) Vector contains names of article author(s)
Author(s)-score Average total CL score for author’s other work
Publisher Publisher name
Publisher-score Average publisher CL score
Links Vector with link information to the news story and other archives
Metadata profile Vector containing the values 
Topic Story topic and related information 
Overall article score Deviation score for the article from μ
Comparative scores List of other CL scores for each of the components used in the overall article score
Related stories List of related stories
Event date Date of the news event
Publication date Date of publication
Table 4: News archive fields
Putting together all three components of this model, the ability to evaluate any news story 
will ultimately be supported by all three components. The entire process is designed for both 
efficiency and the ability to use any single component with high assurance. Fig. 8 depicts the 
overall process flow.
 
Table 1: News article word count
Figure 8: Overview of news processing
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VI. CONCLUSION
The high efficacy and the lost cost make propaganda a useful weapon in warfare. The ability 
to manipulate trust through various media relies on a flawed trust model that relies on ob-
ject-oriented constructs[29], resulting in a loss of context. The model presented provides contex-
tual evaluation of news stories and offers a rapid and less subjective way to evaluate any news 
article and provide an objective measure of the distance between the GT (or fact-based) event 
and the narrative being presented.
Through the use of agreed-upon event reporting metrics, this model provides a starting point 
for evaluating FN in an objective manner. The ability of CL to identify FN has been shown to 
work on a large scale in a similar model[37]. The PS mechanism shows promise but has not been 
executed on a large scale to date[41]. The archives are being populated at several higher learning 
institutions, and these institutions are expanding beyond English language–based stories. The 
archive created for this project will augment existing archives by providing metadata charac-
terizations and other relevant information that can add to other data mining efforts.
The ability to perform temporal analysis on the archives that are being built offers great 
promise because the findings can be combined with cultural and linguistic models that may 
ultimately identify vulnerable traits and ways in which populations can be quickly inoculated 
based on the identified traits. While Cambridge Analytica used data science techniques on 
personal data to identify potential targets, data science combined with cultural frameworks can 
be used for benevolent purposes. 
We conclude with the observation that propaganda has been a long-standing problem with 
FN on the internet, elevating the effectiveness of this tool. Stand-alone point solutions run the 
risk of repeating the mistakes of the signature-based model that prevailed during the early 
days of internet security: they created a false sense of security. Therefore, the ultimate solution 
will likely take time and require the contextual evaluation of events. We suggest that the model 
presented here can meet these new and comprehensive requirements.   
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